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Abstract
The forces of the market and systems competition bring about economic and
social convergence in Europe. There is no need for social policies at the EU level.
Social harmonisation would distort migration flows and slow down the speed of
economic convergence. National welfare states will be threatened by the free
migration of people in Europe. The race to the bottom is a serious risk. However,
to contain this risk, neither harmonisation of welfare payments nor constraints on
migration are needed. The adoption of the principle of selectively delayed
integration is the better alternative.
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 SOCIAL UNION, CONVERGENCE AND MIGRATION
I Introduction
The convergence of living conditions and of social standards is rightfully considered
one of the great goals of the EU. However, does the desirability of convergence mean
that harmonisation policies are needed? Should the EU try to speed up social conver-
gence by setting common standards or even by complementing the economic and
monetary union with a social union right from the beginning of the convergence proc-
ess?
The answer this paper will give is in the negative. Provided that the EU sets the
conditions for economic convergence, social convergence is already being induced by
the forces of economic factor price equalisation and systems competition among coun-
tries that compete for mobile factors of production. Premature social harmonisation
brought about by centralised policy measures would be detrimental in the sense that it
distorts the migration flows and slows down the speed of real economic convergence.
Little can be gained, but much can be lost, by harmonising social conditions faster than
market forces and the forces of systems competition themselves can  bring it about.
The European Convention currently prepares the draft of a European constitution,
and the European social union is on the agenda. The draft makes social protection and
social cohesion  constitutional goals of the EU, and together with the principle of non-
discrimination and EU citizenship these goals could indeed imply premature harmoni-
sation. We will discuss this issue below and argue that the consequences for the eco-
nomic development of Europe would be detrimental.4
To make this point we will not only put forth theoretical arguments, but also ana-
lyse the case of German unification. Germany was united by treaties on the economic,
monetary and social union. We maintain that the economic and monetary unification of
Germany alone would have been compatible with a prosperous development and a self-
sustained upswing of the formerly communist part of the country, but that premature
social unification may be considered the major reason for the economic disaster that has
occurred. East Germany is not catching up and, in fact, the economic gap between the
two parts of the country has widened since 1995.
Our position is not that there should never be a social union of Europe, let alone
that the European welfare state is useless. There is the powerful argument that free mi-
gration may lead to an erosion of the welfare state if migrants are fully included in the
host country's welfare system, and we accept that, in principle, this argument is a ration-
ale for the harmonisation of welfare measures. Nevertheless, we maintain that, at least
during the convergence phase, the principle of delayed integration is a better means to
protect the welfare state against the erosive forces of welfare migration.
It is necessary for our discussion to clearly distinguish between alternative types
of social policies which affect the basic variables of an economy's transition path, in
particular its employment, migration and capital flows. Here we will discuss
i) social work place standards like working conditions or health and safety at work stan-
dards and
ii) the payment of wage replacement incomes such as social or unemployment assis-
tance.
We first discuss the efficient adjustment path of wages and work related standards
chosen by market forces and the forces of systems competition, following a model of5
Sinn (2003), and then illustrate the distortions resulting from premature harmonisation
of social standards and replacement incomes, referring  to  German unification and the
draft proposal of the EU constitution.
II  Migration and Natural Convergence
In 1963, when European borders were still rather closed, the per capita income of Por-
tugal was 22% of that of France. In 2000 the Portuguese per capita income was 48% of
the French. In 1970, Finland’s per capita income was  78% of Germany’s, but now it is
about the same, in fact,  even slightly higher. In 1960, the Belgian per capita income
was nearly 20% higher than the average of the current EU countries. Now Belgium is
hardly distinguishable from the average. The  European countries have been converg-
ing.
While these are  striking examples, the full convergence picture is shown in Fig-
ure 1. In 1963 the variation coefficient of the per capita GDP values (without Luxem-
bourg) was 0.39. By 2000, it had declined to 0.26. This corresponds to an annual con-
vergence rate of 1.1% which is about half the 2 % rate observed elsewhere by  Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) .
In part, convergence results from the forces of factor price equalisation; i.e.
through knowledge spill-overs, commodity trade, capital movements and labour migra-
tion. In part, convergence results from the forces of systems competition which induce
governments to act competitively so as to maintain the attractiveness of their countries
for mobile factors of production. Given that these forces are operative in Europe, it is
not surprising that convergence has occurred.6
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 72, calculations of the ifo Institute.
.
However, convergence cannot occur instantaneously and will take decades even
under the ideal circumstances of the common market that  the EU is providing. This is a
trivial but important point which is crucial for the evaluation for EU harmonisation
policies. Convergence takes time because there are costs of adjustment and migration,
resulting from the need to transport resources and people,  to overcome institutional and
logistical constraints and to compensate for the home preferences that typically charac-
terise Europeans. These costs are less important for knowledge spill-overs and com-
modity trade, but they significantly slow down capital flows and impede the migration
of people.
Sluggishness not only characterises the adjustment of the real economy but also
that of  government policies. It can be assumed that governments try to find an optimal
mix between private and publicly controlled resources at each stage of the adjustment7
process. Poor countries will find it unwise  to match the luxurious infrastructure of some
of the richer countries when people cannot afford the corresponding taxes, and they will
not force their firms to satisfy the same labour standards and pay the same social insur-
ance contributions as the more developed countries can afford. Prudent governments
will develop social standards in line with the real development of the economies they
control.
Figure 2 illustrates the large differences in wages and wage related social costs,
the indirect wage costs, that currently still exist in Europe. The differences are particu-
larly large between the new and the old EU countries, but even among the latter there
are substantial differences that can partly be attributed to the different time of EU acces-
sion. The figure also shows that the differences are not limited to pecuniary wages but
extend fully to indirect wage costs which include employer social insurance contribu-
tions, sick pay schemes, expenses for factory canteens, vocational training and the costs
of social standards. Indirect wage costs can be seen as wages in kind which generate
benefits to the employees and costs to the firms just like normal labour costs. Roughly
speaking, the costs of the indirect wage components are proportional to the direct costs.
Poor countries indeed tend to have low social standards and do not choose a fundamen-
tally different mix of direct and indirect wage components from that of the richer coun-
tries.8
Figure 2: Labour costs in manufacturing in EU countries and EU accession countries
2000 (euro per working hour)


























Direct cost Indirect cost
Note: The figure breaks down labour costs into direct and indirect costs according to EUROSTAT defini-
tions (Schröder 2000, p. 77). Direct costs are defined as gross wages per hour. They include employees’
social security contributions, overtime supplements, shift compensation, regularly paid premia, pay for
annual leave and national holidays etc. Indirect costs consist of employer social insurance contributions,
sick pay schemes, expenses for canteens, vocational training etc. They include the costs of social stan-
dards which the paper considers. EUROSTAT does not, however, take into account all categories of so-
cial standards. Safety requirements for machinery, dismissal protection rules and constraints on working
time are, for example, not included. Indirect labour costs account for 49% of total labour costs. The pro-
portion of indirect to direct wages is higher in the more advanced than in the less-developed countries.
(For EU accession countries the structure of labour costs refers to the whole economy.)
Source: The Cologne Institute for Business Research, database 2001; R. Claire and A. Paternoster , Ar-
beitskostenerhebung 2000 Kandidatenländer, Eurostat, Statistik kurz gefasst, 2002, 3-23.9
To understand the nature of the convergence process, two types of migration or
adjustment costs should be distinguished that impede the migration of labour and capital
and slow down convergence.
1 One is a permanent cost that is a continuing obstacle to
operating in another country but does not reduce the migration speed, and one is an ini-
tial non-recurring cost that reduces the migration speed, but cannot affect the long-run
migration volume. In principle, capital and labour are affected by both types of cost.
However, capital seems to be affected much more by the second and labour much more
by the first type, and this is what we assume. In short, we assume that capital is slow but
has no home bias, and labour is fast but has a home bias.
In the case of capital one may think of the cost of acquiring information, of
learning by doing, of overcoming political constraints and, in particular, of finding the
funds necessary to expand the business. The cost of finance increases progressively with
the investment volume since lenders and owners perceive progressively higher risks.
Empirically, most of the equity capital accumulated after the establishment of new firms
derives from the retention of profits, and debt grows in proportion to equity. This pre-
vents immediate stock adjustments and implies a gradual growth process instead.
In the case of labour migration, the relevant migration costs are of a different na-
ture. European migration is predominantly a kind of commuting with lower or higher
frequencies which incurs a permanent cost as long as a migrant is living abroad.
2 In ad-
dition to the cost of commuting, this type of cost includes the cost of maintaining two
                                           
1  We do not consider convergence theories that describe growth processes of countries that do not inter-
act. (See Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, chs. 1 and 2 ) Such theories make little sense for Europe.
European convergence is driven by trade, factor movements and the exchange of knowledge.
2  Even someone who emigrates for a long period of time can in this sense be seen as a commuter if he
regularly returns home to see his friends and family.10
residences, the cost of paying higher rents in the host country and the subjective and
objective costs of not being able to live in one's home country.
To analyse some important aspects of the convergence process in the presence of
such costs, we initially consider a small, less developed country that joins a large devel-
oped area. Smallness means that the conditions in the large area are not strongly af-
fected by the policies of the joining country and can therefore be taken as given to a first
order of approximation. Assume that the small country represents one of the new acces-
sion countries of the EU and that the large area is the group of old member countries. In
the accession country capital intensity and wages are low, in the core area both are high.
Commodities, financial capital and technical knowledge are completely mobile across
the borders.
Figure 3 illustrates the adjustment process of the accession country in the simpli-
fied form of a supply-demand diagram for the labour market. Employment in the acces-
sion country is measured on the horizontal axis, the wage rate there is shown on the
vertical axis. The initial labour demand curve of the accession country’s employers is
represented by DD, the labour supply curve is represented by SS.
3
The labour demand curve is the usual marginal product curve. It is derived by
ranking potential jobs in the accession country by the value added they generate. If the
wage is lower than the value added, it is profitable for a firm to establish the job and
employ a worker. Given the heterogeneous set of blue prints for potential jobs, the
number of workers who can profitably be employed is obviously the larger the lower the
wage rate. The demand curve is drawn for a given aggregate stock of capital. It will
                                           
3  Related models can be found in Sinn and Sinn (1992, chapter 5) and Sinn (2001).11
shift outward over time if the stock of capital grows. As the specific adjustment cost we
assumed excludes jumps in the size of the capital stock, the position of the curve is
fixed at any given point in time, regardless of the volume of investment. However, the
volume of investment determines the speed at which the curve moves outward over
time.
The supply curve is derived by ranking heterogeneous workers according to their
“stay-put” wages. The “stay-put” wage is the subjective wage at which an inhabitant of
the accession country is indifferent between staying at home and moving to the core
region. The “stay-put” wage of a particular inhabitant of the accession country equals
the wage in the core area, w*, which is also taken to equal the marginal product of la-
bour in the core area minus the migrant's subjective and objective cost of living in the
accession country. Ranking the heterogeneous inhabitants of the accession country by
the size of these costs generates the internal supply curve of the labour market of the
accession country. We assume that a person migrates if his cost falls short of the wage
differential between the core area and the accession country and stays in his home
country if it exceeds this differential.
4 As the number of people whose cost is higher
than the wage differential, and who therefore do not move, is the larger the smaller the
wage differential, the supply curve is upward sloping.
                                           
4  Admittedly, this is a crude simplification of the set of potential motives. See Schmidt (1994) for a
thorough empirical investigation. However, the simplification is sufficient to make our point about the
cost of premature harmonisation and it seems to fit to a first order of approximation to the commuting
type of migration that we observe in Europe which  differs substantially from the more permanent type
of immigration that seems to characterise the US.12
Suppose now that accession takes place at point in time 0, and the previously
closed borders are opened. This will induce inverse cross-border investment and migra-
tion flows between the core area and the accession country, but for the time being the
labour demand curve of the accession country will not be affected. Part of the work
force of the accession country now migrates rapidly to the core area,
5 and the increased
scarcity of labour in the accession country raises the wage rate above its previous level
w0. A temporary equilibrium is found in the labour market of the accession country
where supply equals demand. The wage rate therefore rises to w1 , and the workers
whose jobs are destroyed by this rise, CE, migrate to the core area.
The temporary equilibrium is efficient. Migration replaces the low value added
that migrants could have produced in the accession country with the high value added
they can produce in the core area, which equals w*, and all of those whose net increase
in value added is above the migration cost migrate while all others stay in the accession
country. The Invisible Hand generates an allocation of the work force to the two regions
that maximises the joint GNP net of migration costs that the accession country's popu-
lation is able to generate at home and abroad. It is given by the area under the demand
and supply curves.
Over time, the labour demand curve in the accession country will shift outward
since the comparatively low wage rate  1 w  attracts capital from the core area, and for
each position of the labour demand curve there is a new temporary equilibrium with a
respectively higher wage rate and a smaller stock of migrants. Migrants return to their
home country as its economy catches up and offers an increasingly attractive wage
                                           
5  In Germany, practically all the labour migration took place in the first two years after unification,
while the annual flow of capital to east Germany has been very persistent since the time of unification.13
level. The process comes to a halt when wages in the core area and the accession coun-
try are equal and the former work force is reinstalled in the new member country. This
is symbolised by curve D'D' in the figure.
The Invisible Hand of  competition implies full economic convergence. It not only
determines the efficient temporary equilibrium but also the right speed of the adjustment
process, balancing the unavoidable adjustment costs with the preference for fast conver-
gence.
6 The basic EU policies needed for this process to come about include the crea-
tion of a common market and a monetary union, and indeed these policies have been
adopted and will bring about the expected progress.
The return migration pattern predicted by our model fits the reality of past EU mi-
grations. A substantial part of southern European guest workers, which were recruited to
work in Germany from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, have returned to their
home countries. Observations of immigrants (from Italy, Greece, Spain, former Yugo-
slavia, and Turkey) extracted from the German Socio Economic Panel demonstrate, that
of 3010 immigrants surveyed in 1984, 765 (25%) returned between 1984 and 1997
(Constant and Massey 2002, p. 13). If there were no replacement migration to compen-
sate for some of the return migration, this would correspond to a convergence speed of
2.1% per year which is even higher than the economic convergence speed which we
showed above to be in the order of 1.1%. If half of the observed return migration were
replaced by new emigrants from the accession country, the return migration figure
would roughly fit the actual European speed of convergence.
                                           
6  The formal proof can be found in Sinn (2003, chapter 4).14
Figure 3: The adjustments in the labour market
III  Harmonising Social Standards
Let us now extend the analysis to social standards. Directives and other types of regula-
tion bearing on working standards constitute the main instrument of EU social policy.
As explained above, social standards can be seen as wages in kind that generate utility
for the workers and incur costs for the firms. As both the direct  wage and the wage in
kind are to be paid from the same marginal product of labour, it is in the interest of
workers that these two components are optimally mixed so that their utility is maxi-
mised at any given level of the overall wage cost.
In many cases it can be assumed that this optimal mix is found by the firms them-
selves, for a competitive firm that finds a better mix than its rivals will attract more













problems might legitimate a national policy of setting social standards. However, it is
hard to see why an international body like  the EU should be better able to fix social
standards than the national governments themselves. A national government will have
all the incentives and all the information needed to come up with an optimal policy, and
there is no advantage to the supranational level. In particular, a premature international
harmonisation of social standards at a level that is appropriate for the core area will
definitely be sub-optimal for the accession country for one size cannot fit all.
To analyse the distortion, consider two alternative definitions of the wage rate:
i) the "wage cost" which is the sum of the direct and indirect cost of labour to the firm
and
ii) the "equivalent wage" which is the monetary equivalent of the mix between  the di-
rect and indirect wage components as judged by the workers.
Figure 3 can be taken to refer to the case of optimal mixes in the core area and the
accession country where the respective wage cost equals the equivalent wage. By way
of contrast, Figure 4 represents the case of a sub-optimal mix in the accession country
resulting from premature harmonisation. The core area imposes the standard that is op-
timal under its economic conditions on the economy of the accession country. The ac-
cession country is forced to have a sub-optimal mix between the direct wage and the
wage in kind. A sub-optimal mix means less utility for any given level of the wage cost:
a wedge is driven between the wage cost and the equivalent wage. The demand for la-
bour depends on the wage cost, and the supply of labour depends on the equivalent
wage, but both are no longer equal. As shown in the figure, the equilibrium employment
in the accession country shrinks by FE because more people migrate to the core area.
Workers are able to shift some, but not all of the cost of the sub-optimal mix of the pe-16
cuniary and non-pecuniary wage components to the firms. The wage cost to the firms
rises to  1 w  and the equivalent wage of the workers falls to  1 w .
The harmonisation policy is clearly inefficient. It involves two types of welfare
losses which are represented by the shaded areas in Figure 4. The dotted triangle meas-
ures the deadweight loss from a sub-optimal allocation of the population to the two re-
gions. The shaded  rectangle measures the deadweight loss associated with the sub-
optimal mix as such which has to be borne by all workers in the accession country.
Figure 4: Premature harmonisation of  social standards
The welfare cost illustrated in Figure 4 is of a static nature. It is the cost at one
particular point in time, given the then available stock of capital. There is an additional
cost resulting from the fact that, with any given stock of capital, the wage rate is higher













slower than in the undistorted case. Nevertheless, there continues to be capital accumu-
lation as long as the wage cost in the accession country remains below the cost of the
core area. As the wage cost in the accession country approaches that in the core area, the
distortion resulting from the premature imposition of the social standards of the core
area diminishes with the passage of time. Thus, the labour demand curve continues to
shift to the right, albeit with a lower speed, and it converges as before to the position
D'D'.  In the end, when convergence is completed, the distortion disappears.
In short: the policy of premature harmonisation will not affect the steady state
allocation of labour, but it will imply excessive migration, will impose a deadweight
loss on the total work force of the accession country during the convergence process
and will slow down the convergence process.
This does have implications for the evaluation of EU policy. Thus far, EU social
policy has concentrated on working standards. The origins can be found in Article 117
of the Treaty of Rome which postulated an improvement of working conditions and
living standards. However, the required unanimity had prevented any particular devel-
opment on this matter until 1989. The EU Social Charter signed in that year, with the
exception of the UK, can be seen as a starting point for EU social policy. The Social
Charter gave rise to a host of directives especially bearing on health and safety issues.
The next step towards social harmonisation was taken when provisions on social policy
were included in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). These provisions finally became the So-
cial Chapter of the Treaty of the EU signed in Amsterdam in 1997 by all EU member
countries (including the UK). The Social Chapter extended qualified majority voting to
several new areas including working conditions, information and consultation of em-
ployees as well as gender equality in the labour market. Majority voting facilitated the18
ratification of binding directives in the form of minimum requirements (Bean et al.
1998, pp. 1-9; Feldmann 1999; Kleinman 2002, ch. 4).
7
However, the EU countries seem to have understood that fixing uniform European
social standards is hampered by the diversity of national economic conditions and social
preferences. Thus the 2001 EU Summit in Lisbon opted for an additional governing
mode, the “Open Method of Co-ordination”. The open method of co-ordination leaves
effective social policy choices to the national level, but tries to improve this process by
promoting common objectives and common indicators and by comparative evaluations
of national policy performance (Scharpf 2002). This is exactly what the above consid-
erations would suggest because it effectively avoids premature harmonisation.
One of the arguments often presented in favour of a harmonisation of social stan-
dards is to prevent social dumping, i.e. unfair competition which neglects the welfare of
workers. It is argued that unfavourable working conditions in the less-developed EU
countries are partly the result of an unfair policy which is carried out intentionally, or at
least tolerated, by the national governments. These governments, it is maintained, stick
to low social standards and do not care about low wages because they know that they
result in competitive advantages for the domestic industries.
The accusation of social dumping is made particularly by business representatives
and union leaders of the more advanced countries, and they seek to influence the EU
decision making process by lobbying for early harmonisation. They can also make use
of Art. 139 (2) of the 1997 “Treaty Establishing the European Community” which pro-
                                           
7  EU-citizenship has not yet been very effective in promoting a European Social Union. It remains to be
seen if the inclusion in the EU Constitutional Treaty will change its importance (Closa 1998; Kleiman
2002, chapter 8).19
vides them with the right to take the initiative in formulating social standards, which by
resolutions of the Council of Ministers can become internationally binding rules (Belke
and Hebler 2002, p. 319). In the light of the above discussion, these legal provisions are
dubious, to say the least. They originate from protectionist ideas framed in terms of "fair
competition" among European firms, but in fact they constitute severe obstacles to the
competitive forces that determine an efficient convergence path.
Differences in wages and working conditions reflect transitional phenomena dur-
ing convergence that result from natural and non-surmountable frictions in the interna-
tional allocation of capital and labour. Abstracting from such frictions is appropriate for
a long-run analysis. Indeed, with an unrestricted exchange of goods, free choice of work
place, and free capital movements, the current differences in overall wage costs and
working conditions illustrated in Figure 2 cannot be maintained in the long term. How-
ever, because of the frictions, factor price equalisation cannot, and should not, come
about overnight but will take decades to be achieved. Slow adjustment of social stan-
dards is a natural feature of a transformation process, and premature harmonisation can
only be detrimental.
IV  Harmonising Wage Replacement Incomes
We now turn to the harmonisation of replacement incomes such as social assistance,
unemployment benefits or early retirement schemes. Such replacement incomes are
reservation wages; they create a floor for wages at which the eligible are willing to
work. Since the productivity of a person is at the same time the ceiling of the wage an
employer is willing to pay, there will be no job for this person if the replacement in-
come exceeds his productivity. In the core countries, the actual level of the replacement20
incomes may be manageable, because, or if, the replacement incomes are sufficiently
far below the market wage, but a harmonisation at a level appropriate for the core that is
binding for the accession countries will likely result in mass unemployment there.
Normally, mass unemployment will lead to emigration. However, mass unem-
ployment created by high replacement incomes will not have this effect, because re-
placement incomes paid by the state are stay-put premia. They paralyse the incentive to
look for jobs in the EU core countries if the difference between the core countries’ wage
and the accession country's replacement income is less than the cost of migration. The
higher the replacement income, the smaller is the number of people willing to look for
jobs in the core area.
Figure 5 illustrates this. The replacement income  R w  limits the number of mi-
grants to KC and the number of jobs to AM. Accordingly it results in unemployment of
size MK. The allocation of the accession country’s work force is extremely inefficient.
As too many jobs are destroyed at home, domestic output falls short of the optimum by
OBEM. And as too few people migrate to the core area, foreign output net of migration
costs falls short of the optimum by BIKE. The total welfare loss is the sum of the
shaded areas, i.e. OBIKM. The national product of the EU, net of migration costs,
would rise by this amount if the natural convergence strategy were used instead of har-
monising replacement incomes.
The policy will also be very costly for the government since the unemployed will
have to be financed. In the figure, the area OIKM represents the budget cost to the gov-
ernment. In all likelihood, this budget cost will result in a demand for huge EU equali-
sation and cohesion programmes that generate massive flows of funds from the core
countries to the accession country.21
All of this is extremely inefficient. The budget cost of paying the replacement in-
comes exceeds the welfare cost by the triangle OIB. As the reader can easily verify for
himself, this triangle shrinks to zero relative to the size of the budget cost as the re-
placement income per individual is reduced to the level BE where it would no longer be
binding. It follows that the first step towards a harmonisation of replacement incomes
that effectively constrains the accession country's economy involves a welfare cost
equal to the budget cost of paying the replacement incomes.
To summarise: the harmonisation of minimum replacement incomes such as so-
cial assistance will have two extremely detrimental economic effects. It will produce
unemployment in the accession countries and it will prevent useful and efficient migra-
tion which otherwise would have occurred. Even those whose migration would increase
European GDP by more than the cost of migration stay in the accession countries. The
fiscal cost resulting from unemployment will require compensating fiscal transfers from
core countries. Any small EU fiscal equalisation programme that is used to finance ini-
tial steps towards a harmonisation of welfare payments will incur welfare losses that
are equal in size to the volume of this programme.
To get a feeling for the empirical importance of the problem, Table 1 compares
the level of German social assistance with the wage incomes in the eastern EU acces-
sion countries. Monthly gross wage earnings of an average production worker range
from € 267 in the Slovak Republic to € 469  in Poland, and the corresponding wage in-
comes net of all taxes and social security contributions range from € 322 to € 417 de-
pending on family status and country (for year 2000). These incomes are far less than
west German social assistance which amounts to € 614 for singles and € 1508 for mar-
ried couples with two children.22
Figure 5:  Harmonising replacement incomes
German social assistance payments to singles are two to three times the average
net wage in the four east European accession countries and German social assistance
payments to  families with two children are four to six times the eastern net wage. These
differences are so huge that social harmonisation on the German level would lead to an























Table 1: Net wage earnings in eastern EU accession countries and the level
















Poland 469 322 349
Czech Republic 415 317 417
Slovak Republic 267 214 260
Hungary 300 202 256
West Germany 3185 1541 2135
West German social assistance 614 1508
a) Average production worker
Source: OECD, Taxing Wages 2000 – 2001, Paris 2002; Sinn et al. (2002), p. 10.
V  Lessons from German Unification and the Italian Mezzogiorno
German unification is a warning example of the problems resulting from premature
harmonisation of social replacement incomes and social standards. Germany had to
learn painfully how expensive it is to carry out a policy of social unification against the
forces of the market.
In anticipation of a prosperous future, a policy of equalisation of social conditions
was implemented from the beginning. In 2001 the regular rate of social assistance to the
poor has reached 96.5% of the west German level (Boss 2001, p. 15), and, thanks to
various forms of social transfers, household net-incomes stand at about 80%. Pensions
per recipient are even 110% of the western level (Nierhaus 1999). These figures are
expressed in nominal terms. In real terms they would all be about 10 percentage points
higher.24
Western working standards concerning safety, pension entitlements, unemploy-
ment protection, co-determination rights, tenure laws and many other items were im-
plemented to a large extent in east Germany. There was not even a transition phase for
the adoption of these standards. East German jobs bear nearly the same indirect wage
costs as jobs in the west.
Most of the social transfers paid out in east Germany were replacement incomes
in the sense discussed above which implied high floors on market wages. With these
payments the welfare state has emerged as the major competitor of east German indus-
try in the labour markets and has actually squeezed out east German employment.
Table 2 reports an attempt to calculate the floor on east German wage costs re-
sulting from the level of east German social assistance (minimum guaranteed state in-
come) for alternative hourly "effective wage rates" and for different types of families.
We define the effective wage rate as the net income increase per hour if someone moves
from welfare without work to a regular full time job, and we take all taxes, contributions
and transfers into account that apply in these two economic situations. The initial  rows
show, for the year 2000, the annual replacement income, the replacement wage rate and
the hourly wage cost to the employer that corresponds to assumed alternative effective
wage rates and the actual replacement wage rates in east Germany. The final three rows
show the ratio of that wage cost to the actual average hourly wage cost to a west Ger-
man employer (€ 27.18).
If welfare recipients are willing to accept jobs with net earnings equal to the re-
placement income, their effective wage rate is zero. In this case, the east German wage
cost has to be at least 21.0% for a single person and 47.5% for a worker who is married
and has  three children. If the effective wage rate is € 2.50 per hour, the correspondingly25
higher net wage income results in wage costs to the employer ranging from 38.6% to
65.8% of the average west German wage cost. And if welfare recipients accept only
jobs with an effective wage rate of € 5 per hour then the wage cost to the employer in
east Germany would reach percentages of the west German average wage cost that
range from 62.1% to 86.9%.
Table 2: Lower bound on east German wage as a percentage of west German wage for



























EUR 3.77 6.15 7.98 9.75 11.45
EUR 0 5.71 9.31 10.62 11.83 12.92
2.5 10.49 13.10 14.78 16.37 17.89
(3) East German
hourly wage cost to
the employer
d)
5.0 16.89 18.16 20.08 21.86 23.63
(4) = (3) : 27.18
e) % 0 21.0 34.3 39.1 43.5 47.5
2.5 38.6 48.2 54.3 60.2 65.8
5.0 62.1 66.8 73.9 80.4 86.9
a) Assumed increment of net income per hour from adopting an east German full time job in-
stead of receiving social assistance without working. – 
b) Social assistance per annum, includ-
ing housing allowances. – 
c) Annual replacement income divided by 1700 hours per year. –
d)Wage cost per hour without VAT that corresponds to a  net-of-tax wage income sufficient to
compensate for the replacement wage rate and alternative effective wage rates. – 
e) Average
hourly wage cost to the employer in west Germany in euros; workers and employees in manu-
facturing, trade and banking; without value-added tax (= average wage cost per year divided
by the average number of hours worked in west Germany [1645]).
Source: Federal Statistical Office; calculations of the Ifo Institute.26
Given this information, it is not surprising that the average east German hourly
wage cost to the employer has been rising rapidly after unification and is now standing
at about 70% of the respective west German figures. According to Table 2, 70% corre-
sponds to effective wage rates per hour of between € 2,50 and € 5. These are sufficiently
small numbers to explain why there would be strong resistance in east Germany against
wage cuts bringing the east German wage cost to a lower percentage of that of the west.
Unfortunately, however, the 70% wage cost ratio is the central problem of the east
German economy. The figure is high relative to east German productivity which, in the
aggregate, is only 58% of the west, and it is also high relative to other countries.
Figure 6 gives an overview of the development of the east German and other
countries' labour cost (wage cost to the employer) per hour relative to the respective
west German figure from the time before unification until today, measured at the pre-
vailing exchange rates. The east German hourly labour cost was only 7 % of the west
German level in 1989, but it quadrupled with the currency conversion, and in the fol-
lowing years it jumped to 64% (1994) and then to 70% (1999) of the western level (Sinn
2001, p. 32). After unification, German labour costs quickly surpassed those of Portu-
gal,  reaching  those of Ireland in 1992. In 1995 labour costs per hour in East Germany
were as high as those in France and from that time on they kept pace with France.
The main reason for the rapid wage increase can be sought in the fact that the ini-
tial wage negotiations were proxy negotiations that were carried out by people other
than those who would have had to bear the consequences.
8 The crucial wage negotia-
                                           
8  It is sometimes argued that the effective revaluation that came with the one-to-one currency conver-
sion enacted in 1990 was the major policy mistake behind this development. However, the argument
overlooks that the one-to-one conversion was necessary to preserve the purchasing power of east
German wages. Despite the fact that the exchange rate at which the GDR had been able to sell its mer-27
tions took place in 1991, long before the privatisation of the east German economy had
trade unions about east German wages. There were no east German employers, and east
Figure 6: Hourly industrial labour cost relative to west German costs
Note: The database of the Cologne Institute for Business Research is based on EUROSTATs surveys of
labour costs carried out in 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2000. The interpolations for 1993, 1994 and 1995 were
made by the ifo Institute.
Sources:For Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal and West Germany: Cologne Institute for Business Re-
search, Hourly Labour Cost of Blue-collar Workers in Manufacturing, database. For East Germany and
West Germany: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder”, Arbeitnehmerent-
gelte (Inland), 1991 bis 2001; Autorengemeinschaft des IAB, Der Arbeitsmarkt in den Jahren 2000 und
2001 sowie 2001 und 2002; calculations of the ifo Institute.
                                                                                                                               
chandises in the west was 4.3:1, the east German mark had been more valuable to east German con-
sumers at east German prices than the west German mark was at west German prices because the
prices of consumer goods were much lower in the east than in the west. Thus there was no politically
feasible way by which the one-to-one conversion could have been avoided. In terms of consumer
goods, wages in the east were about one third of the west before and after the currency conversion.
Had that wage level been preserved until privatisation was completed, the east German economy
would have become competitive very quickly as international investors would have flooded into the
country. The new funds and the transfer of knowledge would have created a second economic miracle















German workers had no say. The west German negotiators were determined to adjust
eastern wages as quickly as possible to the western level to eliminate the risk that low-
wage competition by eastern firms, revitalised with fresh international capital and know
how, would reduce profits and jobs in the west.
While the proxy negotiations triggered off the wage adjustment, they cannot ex-
plain the persistence of high wages in east Germany to this day. Surprisingly, wages
have remained high despite the fact that the new entrepreneurs that were lured to the
east with generous government subsidies tried to escape from the contracts as soon as
they had taken command. As of today, only 15% of east German firms and no more
than 45% of the privately employed east German work force is covered by union con-
tracts. Nevertheless, wages do not react to the mass unemployment. This persistence is
undoubtedly due to the welfare state itself. For the reasons explained in Table 2, it is not
really possible to reduce the wages significantly below their current levels without vio-
lating the reservation wage constraint stemming from the minimum replacement in-
comes the welfare state offers in east Germany.
The consequences of the high wage strategy are well known. The east German
economy collapsed immediately after unification, with 80% of the industrial jobs being
destroyed, industrial output falling by more than 60% and GDP falling by more than a
third. After this collapse there was a straw fire until 1996 that was nourished by an ex-
tremely generous investment subsidy programme which effectively eliminated the cost
of capital, even pushing it to negative values. As soon as this programme was cancelled,
the east German economy began to slump, and the gap between western and eastern
GDP per capita widened in every consecutive year. Ordinary employment paying social
security contributions has been shrinking at an annual rate of nearly 2% during this29
time, and mass unemployment has grown to dangerously high levels. Investment in
equipment per person of working age which, under the investment subsidy programme,
had peaked at 144% of the western level, fell to only 88% in 2002.
In the first decade after unification, the west German government transferred a net
amount of € 750 billion to east Germany, a sum that was mostly financed by public bor-
rowing. The sum is ten times as large as the sum that Chancellor Kohl's political oppo-
nent Oscar Lafontaine had once claimed German unification would cost and that con-
tributed to his defeat in the election. Currently, the annual transfer still amounts to about
€ 80 billion, which corresponds to about 4,0% of west German GDP. The east German
current account deficit is about 45% of its own GDP. About three quarters of this deficit
is financed by  public transfers, and only one quarter by private capital flows. However,
a substantial part of the private capital flows are used to buy the bonds issued by the
east German states with the consequence that the debt/GDP ratio of the east German
states has already surpassed that of their western counterparts. This development is not
sustainable.
The east German situation parallels the Italian Mezzogiorno which has not caught
up with the north, stagnating  at a GDP per capita of about 60% of northern Italy, which
is the same figure as that for Germany. Unemployment in the Mezzogiorno is persistent,
and permanent transfers from the north are necessary to compensate for the poor eco-
nomic performance. Although the current account deficit is only 13% of GDP rather
than the German 45%, the similarities are striking (Sinn and Westermann 2000, p. 5).
A particularly important similarity concerns the causes of the Italian problem
which can be seen in wage harmonisation brought about by the collective bargaining30
process (Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa 1991, Sinn and Westermann 2000).
9 The exist-
ing gap goes back to the fact that north Italian wages exceed the nation-wide union
wages on average, while south Italian wages are rather close to the union wages.
That the wages are too high becomes obvious when the unemployment situation is
considered. In 2002 the unemployment rate in the north was as low as 4%, whereas the
unemployment rate in the south was as high as 18%. More than 60% of the 2 million
unemployed workers estimated by the labour force surveys live in the southern regions
of Italy. Since the 1970s, the difference in unemployment rates has been very similar to
the present situation (Bertola and Garibaldi 2002). In addition to the high unemploy-
ment rate, the Mezzogiorno is dependent on governmental transfers whose magnitude in
1988 amounted to 20% of the regional GDP. At that time transfers amounted to roughly
€ 40 billion. Recently, the Italian subsidies have declined, having partly been replaced
by EU subsidies (Belke and Hebler 2002, p. 315; Sinn and Westermann 2000, pp. 8- 9).
The German and the Italian policy mistakes should not be repeated at the Euro-
pean level. Social standards, social assistance, unemployment benefits and wages must
continue to be considerably lower in the less-advanced countries than in the core areas
during a long transition period and until an adequate capital stock has been accumu-
lated. As to the wage proxy negotiations, they can be ruled out for the EU accession
countries because negotiations there will take place between national trade unions and
national employers. It is hard to imagine that they will come under pressure from the
core countries. With respect to social standards and wage replacement incomes, how-
ever, the situation is different. The EU, bullied by labour unions and employer associa-
                                           
9  A regional wage differentiation was possible in the 1950s and early 1960s and has again been possible
since 1999.31
tions, might try to impose minimum social standards and welfare levels on the new
member countries.
VI  Social Inclusion, EU Constitution and Labour Migration: Lessons for Europe
Unfortunately, the risk that the Italo-German development model will be repeated in
Europe will rise significantly if the draft proposal of the European constitution that the
European Convention presented in February 2003 will be accepted The problem lies in
the proclamation of European citizenship (Art. 7) in combination with the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of national citizenship (Art. 6) and the proclaimed goals of
social protection and social cohesion (Art. 3 and 12). All of these clauses were included
in earlier EU treaties and were implicit in the decisions of the European Court of Jus-
tice, but now they are to be elevated to the status of constitutional law. This new supe-
rior status would imply that they would supersede all existing European laws and trea-
ties. In particular, it seems likely that the limitations of the so-called social inclusion
principle that are currently in place would be eliminated, implying a social union for
Europe.
The inclusion principle is currently interpreted to mean that an EU citizen who
moves from one EU country to another in order to work is immediately and fully inte-
grated into the social system of the host country. The immigrant pays taxes and social
insurance contributions and, together with his family, is eligible for all state benefits
available to domestic employees. An immigrant worker with a below-average income
profits from the income redistribution of the welfare state just as a national does. Based
on statistical information on past immigrants to Germany, the Ifo Institute calculated
that the net amount of resources received per person and year was approximately €32
2,300 in the first ten years.
10 A family of four living in Germany for ten years would
accordingly receive an immigration premium of nearly € 100,000.
Restricting the inclusion principle to working immigrants has limited this kind of
immigration subsidy. Those who immigrate for reasons other than employment receive
no welfare benefits apart from emergency health care. However, the proposals of the
European Convention could mean that the inclusion principle will apply to all migrants
from EU countries, including pensioners and other people who are not included in the
discrimination clause in connection with EU citizenship in the sense of full social inclu-
sion. Courts have already rendered generous rulings on the inclusion principle based on
the present EU treaties.
Welfare shopping would be the constitutional right of every EU citizen, amplify-
ing current problems with the inclusion principle. If having work is no longer required
before immigrating to a welfare state, the flood-gates will be opened. Masses of poverty
refugees will move from eastern European countries to the west to seek their fortune.
The transitional, post-enlargement regulations will only help temporarily. The financial
burdens that already plague western European welfare states will become so enormous
that radical cuts will be inevitable.
Traditional social welfare states could not be maintained under these circum-
stances because governments will try to stem migration by reducing social benefits.
Since highly mobile poverty refugees have their choice of western European welfare
                                           
10 Ifo calculations are based on a „fiscal balance“ of   previous immigration to Germany and include
social insurance, tax-financed social services and all state revenue and expenditure (Sinn et al. 2001, p.
227).33
states, these governments would compete in warding them off. With the inclusion prin-
ciple in force, welfare states are forced to participate in a race to the bottom.
International harmonisation of social replacement incomes at the EU level could
prevent this, and in fact the draft constitution contains sufficient references to social
protection and cohesion of Europe that would encourage such policies.
But this would mean chaos since social standards acceptable to the more devel-
oped countries would produce mass unemployment in Europe, as we explained above.
As is shown in Figure 7, in all eastern European countries net wage income is less than
30% of west German social assistance, and even the present EU contains Portuguese,
Greek and Spanish regions where net wage income is less than half the German welfare
level. A harmonisation of social assistance at a level still acceptable to mature western
European economies would lead to the de-industrialisation of whole regions in southern
and eastern Europe and would put a halt on their economic development.
The economic pain of the less developed countries must then be eased by inter-
governmental fiscal transfers from the more developed regions. The cohesion principle
in the draft constitution would permit such a policy. The Italo-German figures of public
transfers in the order of 20%-30% of the South Italian and East German GDPs indicate
the orders of magnitude involved.
There is a growing consensus that the EU institutional structure should be
equipped to deal with the risk of race-to-the-bottom tensions in the field of welfare pol-
icy (Bertola et al. 2001, pp. 89-–96). In order to prevent a race to the bottom it has been
proposed to establish an EU transfer system to guarantee a minimum welfare level to all
citizens.  For  Bertola  et  al.  (2001,  pp. 105-107) some interjurisdictional redistribution34
Figure 7: Social inclusion and the new European Mezzogiornos, 2000
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b)  Net wage income
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a) One earner couple with 2 children, average production worker. b) Couple with 2 children.
Sources: OECD, Taxing Wages 2000 - 2001, Paris 2002; EUROSTAT, Statistics in Focus, 3/2001 
and 4/2001; Sinn et al. (2002).
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and the resulting unemployment is hardly avoidable given the different income levels of
EU countries. Hence, minimum welfare transfers should be co-financed by the EU
budget. When targeting minimum assistance levels, policy makers should bear in mind
the trade-off between welfare shopping and employment. In order to prevent welfare
shopping, the minimum standard needs to be specified in absolute terms rather than in
relation to local incomes. Cost-of-living differentials should, however, be taken into35
account by the definition of country-specific and region-specific minimum levels of
welfare provision. On the other hand, uniform absolute welfare standards would have
negative employment effects in relatively poor countries or regions, since they increase
the reservation wage. In order not to reduce employment, minimum assistance levels
should be specified on a relative basis, as a proportion of local average earnings, and
they would be much lower in Portugal and Poland than in Germany or the United King-
dom. Guided by the extent of labour mobility, a compromise between fixing minimum
assistance levels in absolute EU-wide terms or targeting them in relation to local aver-
age earnings should be found.
We do not agree with this proposal because a partial harmonisation of wage re-
placement incomes means a partial catastrophe of the type we observe in the Italian and
German Mezzogiornos. Europe cannot afford more mass unemployment, let alone mass
unemployment concentrated in its backward regions. Admittedly, some harmonisation
of replacement incomes could make sense in the far distant future when the economic
convergence process has come to an end, to prevent a race to the bottom, but even then
harmonisation would not require any international transfer payments, let alone the es-
tablishment of an EU institution for that purpose.
VII The Principle of Selectively Delayed Integration and the EU Constitution
As an alternative to a harmonisation of replacement incomes, the Expert Council of the
German Ministry of Finance (2001), the Ifo Institute (Sinn et al. 2001) and recently the
European Economic Advisory Group (2003) have proposed the "principle of selectively
delayed integration" of immigrants into the welfare state. This is a modified version of36
the home country principle for welfare benefits.
11 Immigrants pay taxes and social secu-
rity contributions as resident citizens and they have, in turn, free access to the public
infrastructure, to police, to legal protection and to free education; they also receive un-
diminished benefits from the contribution-financed social system. But certain tax-
financed benefits like social assistance, rent subsidies, and public housing would not be
available during some initial period of residence. The range of benefit restrictions would
be balanced so that the present value of the benefits the immigrants receive is equal to
the present value of the taxes and contributions they pay. The principle is that any EU
citizen can migrate and work freely but would receive no gifts from the host country. As
we stated above, empirically these gifts amounted to € 2300 per person and year during
the first ten years after immigration to Germany or nearly € 100.000 for a family of four
in total. The principle of selectively delayed integration would therefore have significant
economic consequences.
Even with delayed integration into the welfare state, there will be migration, but it
will be driven by the genuine incentives of the market economy rather than the artificial
incentives set by the welfare state. With a single stroke the welfare policy of the na-
tional governments could be freed from having to take into account the migration proc-
esses it itself causes, and the forces eroding the welfare state would be tamed. The race
to the bottom would not take place. The protective harmonisation of social replacement
incomes would be unnecessary and, what is more, the economic forces that bring about
social convergence in Europe would be strengthened. As was explained above, the pre-
mature harmonisation of replacement incomes in Europe would drive up wages in the
                                           
11  See also Richter (2002) and Sinn (2002).37
less developed countries and slow down capital investment. Adopting the principle of
selectively delayed integration would prevent this development.
The introduction of the principle of delayed integration is particularly timely in
the light of the eastern enlargement of the EU scheduled for 2004, because the welfare
gaps with regard to these countries are particularly large and substantial migration flows
are expected. The EU has already agreed on a seven year transition period during which
there will be quantity constraints on migration and bureaucrats will select the migrants
according to specific criteria. This solution implies a postponement of some of the basic
liberties granted in the Treaty of Rome (Sinn 2003, ch. 3). It is a severe intervention in
the market process which will lead to large welfare losses due to inefficiently low mi-
gration volumes and a distorted selection of migrants relative to what a market solution
would have brought about. The principle of delayed integration is the better alternative.
When the principle of selectively delayed integration into the welfare state is ap-
plied, economic and social convergence brought about by the forces of private and gov-
ernmental competition will be fast and efficient. The social objectives of Europe can be
reached without the enormous economic costs in terms of unemployment and distorted
migration decisions that otherwise would have to be borne. However, in order for this
solution to be achieved, the non-discrimination clause in Article 6 of the draft of the
constitution will have to be abandoned or at least restricted to issues other than social
transfers.   
There are important examples for a partial implementation of the home country
principle that are similar to the idea of delayed integration. Swiss cities provide certain
kinds of welfare assistance to citizens born in the city even if they live elsewhere. The
United States practises a world-wide income concept forcing American firms and indi-38
viduals operating and living abroad to declare their incomes and pay taxes in the US. It
would be wise for the EU to write the new constitution in a way that makes it possible
to follow these examples and to pave the way for the principle of selectively delayed
integration.
VII  Conclusions
Europe is converging much faster than could have been expected twenty years ago. The
creation of the common market for goods and services and the completion of a single
capital market by means of a common currency have levelled the playing field. Invest-
ment and other forces of growth have been shifting to the previously disadvantaged
countries, and the old core countries have lost their advantages of size and location.
Economic convergence automatically brings about social convergence. Wages are be-
coming more and more equal, and the countries whose economies are catching up can
also afford steady improvements of their social standards. No doubt, the forces of the
market and systems competition bring about rapid social convergence.
Beyond the creation of common capital, goods and labour markets as well as in-
ternational transfers for the purpose of supporting infrastructure investment, the EU can
do very little to improve or speed up the convergence process. In particular, there is no
need for social policies at the EU level. Such policies incur the risk of distorting the
migration decisions and slowing down capital flows to the disadvantaged regions. The
examples of east Germany and the Italian Mezzogiorno point to the economic horrors
that would result. A premature harmonisation of social standards is the recipe for the
guaranteed failure of economic growth in Europe.39
It is true that the welfare state will be threatened by the free migration of people in
Europe. The race to the bottom is a serious risk. However, to contain this risk, neither
harmonisation of welfare payments nor constraints on migration are needed. The adop-
tion of a weak version of the home country principle for intra-EU migration, which we
call the principle of selectively delayed integration, is the better alternative. Adhering to
this principle will ensure a maximal convergence speed and safeguard the European
welfare state despite the increasing mobility of people. The fathers and mothers of the
European constitution should think about the economic consequences of their recom-
mendations. Sometimes ideals will not materialise when they are enforced by binding
legal provisions.40
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